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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

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
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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

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22 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Special Policy & Executive Staff

SUBJECT : Analysis of Riot Planning

1. This Analysis of Riot Planning at the federal, state and local levels is submitted as requested.

2. PURPOSE:


The purpose of this document is to determine the overall authority, policies, responsibilities, relationships and plans at the federal, state and local levels to cope with civil disturbances or riots with particular emphasis given to the Washington, D. C. area; to determine the current status of CIA responsibility, plans, procedures and relationships with other agencies, federal and state and local police for protecting CIA facilities during such crises; and to give suggestions for possible improvement.

3. SITUATION:

a. Past riots, demonstrations, and current unrest among certain elements throughout the United States, which have resulted in extensive damage (including murder, looting, stealing, breaking into private and public buildings, etc.) are sufficient reasons to assume that this unrest will continue well into the foreseeable future. Well-known sociologists have stated that "There isn't a metropolitan area in the United States, especially the 15 or so largest, where this isn't possible." Public officials at the highest level are keenly aware of the possibility of more serious explosions, and have stated that Washington, D. C. could become the scene of riots far more serious than Los Angeles.

b. The following was extracted from an article in an OSI publication "Significant Counterintelligence Briefs" which in turn was taken largely from an FBI analysis of the Los Angeles riots. "The FBI assessment states that there is no evidence that the Los Angeles

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disorders were sponsored by any particular group or organization. It appears to have occurred spontaneously. Knowledgeable observers, in evaluating the potential for race violence, report the potential for outbreak of riots or other forms of violence continues to exist and could develop from any one or more of a number of factors inherent in our society today. An atmosphere of restlessness and a sense of distrust of constituted authority permeates many areas in our country, creating a latent but volatile element which is susceptible to expression in the form of mob violence at the slightest provocation. These conditions, present in hundreds of cities throughout the United States in varying degrees, qualify these municipalities as potential centers of racial violence.

c. CIA installations, [REDACTED] could and probably will be prime targets.

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d. CIA private contractors which are performing classified work could also be prime targets.

e. When such action is directed against CIA installations and personnel, including CIA private contractor installations, obvious serious security problems will arise.

4. SUMMARY AND ACTION SUGGESTIONS:

This paragraph sets forth a brief analysis of each major item or factor as contained in the basis memorandum and the several Tabs, and contains suggestions for future courses of action in respect to preparatory riot planning or coordination necessary to protect CIA interest, personnel and facilities which house classified material.

a. Reference Tab A, Executive Order 10501.

This Executive Order gives the basic protective criterion for facilities wherein classified material will be used or stored. It also makes each Agency or department head responsible for approving such facilities. This Order is not limiting but all inclusive, therefore, it must be assumed that where riots are probable the intent of said Order is that such contingencies must be taken into consideration, to include the establishment of proper safeguards as appropriate and reasonable by what ever means available.

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As pointed up elsewhere in this document it would appear that CIA, because of the current unrest generally throughout the country and the probability of additional large scale riots, must take a hard look regarding its current protective status in this respect and then must ensure that all reasonable preparatory measures are taken to put its house in order in all areas of the country.

b. Reference Tab B, Federal Duty and Power to Keep the Public Peace.

(1) The Federal Government has no general power or duty to keep the peace in the several states, except when states and local authorities cannot or fail to keep the peace. Then the Federal Government brings to bear what ever force and authority is needed, i. e., mediation by U. S. Officials, U. S. Marshals, the Military, etc.

(2) The District of Columbia, being a federal domain, is directly under federal authority, however, the over-all protective jurisdiction and command authority among the several protective elements is not clear when it comes to suppressing large scale riots, or until the District is occupied by Federal Troops.

Action Suggested:

(1) Consideration should be given to establishing Liaison with the Deputy Attorney General under which U. S. Marshals operate or with the Head Marshal concerning current planning in this area, and U. S. wide.

(2) Consideration should be given to having one or more OS officials made U. S. Marshals with their duties and responsibilities limited to CIA matters, facilities, etc. This would give CIA needed arrest and detention powers at a term of stress.

c. Reference Tab C, State Duty and Power to Keep the Public Peace.

The state and local authority has the basis authority

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and responsibility to keep the peace within their jurisdiction. CIA has many installations, including private contractors, which are doing classified work located within such jurisdictions.

Action Suggested:

The matter of preparatory planning and protective support during riots should be a matter of dialogue or colloquy between CIA and CIA private contractors which house classified material. The goal should be to make an estimate of the situation to be followed with a riot plan for each facility as needed. This could well mean establishing liaison with appropriate State officials, U. S. Army Area Commanders and U. S. Marshals (See Tab B).

d. Reference Tab D, The National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949.

The responsibility of the DCI to protect Intelligence and Intelligence Sources and Methods (except for use of firearms) and the Director to authorize CIA couriers to carry firearms are well documented. However, the authority of the Agency (Director of Security) to issue firearms to CIA employees (Security Patrol) for their use (shoot to kill, if deemed necessary) in their official duty in protecting CIA personnel and facilities is questionable. Guns are often needed during riots. They were issued to the Security Patrol until recently and they have been carried while on duty, and our regulation authorized such use.

Action Suggested:

The General Counsel should be requested to clarify this authority, and guns should not be issued until this has been finalized in the affirmative. Then before issue, each individual should be trained, not only in its physical use, but in guideline on when to use and to shoot, including when to kill.

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e. Reference Tab E, Office of Security.

Agency regulation HR [REDACTED] establishes the CIA Security Patrol for the purpose of protecting classified material, installations, property and personnel of the Agency in the United States in the event of riot, national disaster, enemy attack, etc.

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Action Suggested:

A realistic review should be made and solutions arrived at concerning the Patrol's competence, area of jurisdiction and use during riots of the Los Angeles scale. Actually what we mean by protecting CIA personnel and property in the United States (implies U. S. wide) is not clear, however, it implies police type actions anywhere in the U. S. The capability as observers, assisting GSA Special Police at Key places, directing traffic on CIA property, maintaining liaison with regular law enforcement officers and the like are well within its competence. However, action beyond this type function during a riot is questionable and should be clarified. (Related to par. 4d above)

f. Reference Tab F, CIA Emergency Planning Officer.

(1) Regulations HR [REDACTED] makes the CIA/EPO responsible for the development and preparation of plans of action to be taken in the event of any type of emergency situation which might affect the normal operation of the Agency. civil disturbance and riots are specifically listed. Excluded is fire and safety.

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(2) HR [REDACTED] gives the Office of Security the function of inter-alia, "Recommend the establishment of Agency Policies relating to Security and establish procedures for their implementation" and "Establish safeguards to prevent physical penetration of the Agency establishments by unauthorized individuals."

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(3) The above functions of the Director of Security and the CIA/EPO are in direct conflict, and the proposed revisions are similarly worded. Therefore, these regulations should be clarified to ensure that responsibility is clearly stated. According to current and proposed revision of regulations the Director of Security is regulated out of responsibility for riot planning. This should be clarified.

g. Reference Tab G, General Services Administration.

We are not aware of GSA's over-all plan of protection in the Washington, D. C. area, nor of their several Regional plans to protect federal property. We are not aware of Top authority within the District during a large scale riot, short of occupation by Federal Troops.

Action Suggested:

(1) CIA should be knowledgeable of GSA's District and Regional plans for protecting federal buildings and an evaluation should be made as to their adequacy to protect CIA facilities. Inadequacies found should be coordinated with GSA for correction. GSA plans should be brought into sharp focus with other protective agencies (District police, park police, etc.) within the District and throughout the U. S. insofar as CIA facilities and interest are concerned. Relationship should be determined, and who will do what during riots should be firmly established. This would govern CIA plans and actions.

(2) The Protection Command Structure for the District, short of occupation by Federal Troops, should be known.

(3) OS Liaison with GSA should be extended to include riots planning and action.

h. Reference Tab H, District of Columbia Police.

The District of Columbia Police Force has well defined responsibility and authority, except as riots are concerned. Their relationship with GSA, park police, etc. is somewhat fuzzy.

Action Suggested:

(1) OS liaison should be extended to the Office of the

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Chief of Police insofar as riot planning and support is concerned. Liaison now is at the Precinct level, and does not include large scale riot planning.

(2) CIA should be knowledgeable of the District's riot plans and their adequacy for protecting CIA facilities.

(3) CIA should be knowledgeable of the District police relationship with other law enforcement agencies during riots.

i. Reference Tab I, U. S. Park Police.

The plan, capability, responsibility, and relationship with other police forces by the U. S. Park Police for coping with riots are not known. This includes relationship with the State of Virginia, Fairfax and Arlington County Police.

Action Suggested:

OS liaison with the U. S. Park Police should be extended to include Park Police plans, capabilities, and support during riots.

j. Reference Tab J, U. S. Capitol Police.

Action Suggested:

That liaison be established with the U. S. Capitol Police on their plans and actions during riots as they might affect the interest of CIA.

k. Reference Tab K, CIA Contractors.

Plans for the protection of CIA private contractors which house classified material are not known, and there are reasons to believe that many would not be properly protected.

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Action Suggested:

That the matter of riot protection be discussed with each such contractor, an estimate of the situation be developed and solutions to problems areas be raised with proper authority with the view of providing adequate protection to such facilities (See Tabs B and C).

(S)


Special Assistant,
Executive & Planning Division

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Attachments:
As stated

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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB A

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10501

Safeguarding Official Information in the Interest of the Defense of the United States

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to give excerpts of Executive Order 10501 showing basic responsibility for ensuring that protection of classified material is provided.

1. Section 6, "Custody and Safekeeping."

"The possession or use of classified defense information or material shall be limited to locations where facilities for secure storage or protection thereof are available by means of which unauthorized persons are prevented from gaining access thereto."

2. This Order outlines basic responsibility and minimum requirements and conditions for the storage and safekeeping of classified matter. It does not differentiate between types of conditions which might influence the degree of protection. Therefore, where riots and other civil disturbances are probable for the area, it should be assumed that such conditions must be included in the protective criterion for facilities which house classified matter. It should be noted, however, that this Executive Order does not state who shall furnish the protection, but the Agency head must be governed by appropriate criterion, which now would include riots, in approving facilities within the U.S. for the storage of his classified material.

3. It is interesting to note that under the Federal Property and Administrative Service Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 377 as amended, 5 USC, 630) effective 1 July 1949, the General Service Administration is given the responsibility for protecting property and facilities under its control (during riots also) which house accommodations for Government activities. (See Tab G) This is all inclusive, however, it does not preclude an Agency head from unilaterally providing more stringent protection than provided by GSA.

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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB B

Federal Duty and Power to Keep the Public Peace

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to give the broad Federal Duty, Responsibility and Power to keep the public peace.

1. General:

"In contrast to the States, the Federal Government has no general power or duty to keep the peace. Its powers are limited to two situations. First, to assist a State if it so requests, in suppressing domestic violence, and second, to enforce the Constitution and laws of the United States, to protect rights guaranteed by that Constitution and those laws, and to protect Federal property and functions." (Art. IV, Section 4 of the Constitution)

2. Conditions of Federal Assistance:

a. "The United States shall protect States against invasion and on application of the legislature, or of the Executive against domestic violence. The Supreme Court has held that 'it rests with Congress... to determine the means proper to be adopted' to exercise this power, however, Congress has delegated to the President the discretion as to whether to call out the militia. In fact, 'the entire strength of the Nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all National powers and the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care.' This protection guaranteed by the Constitution may be executed by the United States on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it." (Art. IV, Section 4 of the Constitution)

b. The use of Federal Officials to keep the peace in States has in general occurred only when it became clear that State and local officials were unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibilities. Where such Federal intervention has occurred, conflict of Federal and State authority and law arise. If such conflict cannot be avoided, the Federal law is supreme.

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c. Examples of the Use of Federal Power:

(1) The Whisky Insurrection of 1794, in four Pennsylvania Counties, the militia was used.

(2) The Fries Insurrection of 1799, Troops were called out.

(3) The Dorr Rebellion of 1842, the President's announcement that he would call out the militia put an end to it.

(4) The Anthony Burns riots in Boston in 1854, mobs of over 50,000 were involved. The Marines put the house in order.

(5) Labor disputes beginning in 1877 resulted in riots making use of Federal Troops necessary.

(6) The greatest riot of all occurred in 1894 in connection with railroad strikes. Riots ranged from Chicago, Indiana, to California and in most cities in between. Marshals were powerless. Chicago required a total force of 14,000 consisting of 5,000 deputy marshals, with others being militia and police.

(7) The "Bonus Army" marched into Washington (15,000) in 1932. The Army finally was called out.

(8) During recent times in connection with Civil Rights both the Military and U. S. Marshals have been used.

Comment:

The President has the power, granted by Congress, to use U. S. Marshals and U. S. Troops (National Guards when Federalized and the Regular Armed Forces) under conditions outlined above. As pointed out he has and is now using both Marshals and Federal Troops for Civil Rights purposes.

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3. U. S. Military (Regular Army and National Guard):

a. Military Used as Necessary:

Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstruction, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the Armed Forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws as to suppress the rebellion. (Title 10, U. S. Code, Section 332)

b. Interference with State and Federal Law:

"The President, by using the militia as the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy, if it:

(1) So hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within that State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution, and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give the protection; or

(2) Oppose or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under these laws."

"In any situation covered by (1) above, the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution." (Title 10, U. S. Code, Section 333)

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c. Army Area Within the United States:

The United States is divided into six Army Areas as indicated below:

<u>Army Area</u>	<u>Headquarters Location</u>
1st Army Hdqtrs.	Ft. Jay, New York
2nd Army Hdqtrs.	Ft. George G. Meade, Md.
3rd Army Hdqtrs.	Ft. McPherson, Georgia
4th Army Hdqtrs.	Ft. Sam Houston, Texas
5th Army Hdqtrs.	U. S. Army Spt. Center Chicago, Illinois
6th Army Hdqtrs.	Presidio of San Francisco, California

4. The United States Marshal:

1. Establishment:

A U. S. Marshal under the Deputy Attorney General is appointed for each judicial district by the President and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Appointment are for four years. The Attorney General may authorize any U. S. Marshal to appoint deputies and clerical assistants.

2. Geographic Area of Jurisdiction:

The geographic area of jurisdiction is confined to each Marshal's judicial district unless otherwise officially called to duty elsewhere.

3. Basic Authority and Responsibility:

a. The U. S. Marshal of each district is the Marshal of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals when sitting in his district. He may be required to attend any session of the Court.

b. The U. S. Marshals are directed by statute to "execute all lawful writs, process and orders issued under the authority of the United States." This authority includes the execution of decrees of Federal Courts, and the carrying out of orders or instructions issued by the President, in the exercise of his authority to "take care

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that the laws be faithfully executed." In particular, 10 USC 333 authorizes the President, where necessary, to protect Federal rights or to enforce Federal law, to suppress domestic violence by the use of the Military; the Armed Forces; or by any other means. The legislative history of this provision reflects that one "other means," which was contemplated, is the U. S. Marshal. Accordingly, U. S. Marshals have been used to help keep the peace in several recent situations involving the protection of Federal Constitutional rights.

c. In the exercise of this power the U. S. Marshal may "command all necessary assistance to execute his duties." 28 USC 547 (b) is a provision which allows him to summon a Posse Comitatus in the ancient manner of the sheriff. The Posse Comitatus has been called out by the Marshal on a number of occasions, although not recently. Marshals are prohibited by law from using the Army or the Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the law.

d. U. S. Marshals may make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence; or for any felony cognizable under Federal law if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony. In addition, U. S. Marshals, in executing the laws of the United States, may exercise the powers which the sheriff of the State may exercise in executing State law.

e. Other Civil Officers: The reference, 10 USC 333, to "any other means" may suggest the possible use of other Federal Civil Officers to suppress disorder. However, this has not been the practice. FBI Agents have not been used for suppression support because they are often called upon to investigate such situations during or after the emergency.

4. Comment:

a. The Office of Security report on liaison with other Government Agencies, 25 August 1965, does not indicate liaison with the Deputy Attorney General or the U. S. Marshals Office for any purpose, including procedures or plans for the protection of U. S. installations. (U. S. Marshals come under the Deputy Attorney General.) However,

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GSA under its overall responsibility, has established liaison at the Washington level with Justice for this purpose.

b. Since CIA officials do not have arrest powers, it is probably advisable that one or more CIA officials (Security) at Headquarters should be appointed as U. S. Marshal. That is, unless current support from GSA and U. S. Marshals is sufficient. This should be determined. Further consideration should be given to the establishment of liaison by OS with the Deputy Attorney General, or the Head of the U. S. Marshal's Office, regarding support plans for riots by Marshals throughout the United States.

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TAB

ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB C

State Duty and Power to Keep the Public Peace

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to give the broad duty and responsibility of the State to keep the public peace.

1. Under our Constitutional system the primary responsibility for suppressing public disorder and keeping the public peace rests with the States. Riots and the crimes committed incidental thereto, such as assault and battery, malicious destruction of property, and looting, are all violations of State law, no matter what the origin or objective of the riot may be. The Federal Government has neither the power nor the responsibility to do ordinary police duties in the States. If a State cannot protect itself against domestic violence, the United States may, upon the call of the Executive (Governor or Legislature), lend their assistance for that purpose. This is a guaranty of the Constitution (Art. 4, Section 4). In accordance with this interpretation, it is clearly the responsibility of the State and local governments and their law enforcement officers to prevent and suppress riots and other domestic violence. 41 Opinions Attorney General 313, 324 (1957).

2. The States may not lawfully refrain from action on the ground that Federal laws are or may be in some way involved in the riot action, its origin or consequences. "It is the duty and the right, not only of every peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of any breach of the peace of the United States." In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 535 (1895). State officers are authorized to make arrests for Federal officers. Both Federal and State Courts have upheld such arrest.

3. "The Federal Constitution, and Federal laws enacted pursuant to it, are the supreme law of the land, which all State officials are sworn to support. Acts of violence or forcible resistance to Federal law disrupts peace and order in the State and violates State law.

It then is the duty of State officers to suppress the disorder."

"When State officers refuse or fail to discharge their duty in this respect it becomes the responsibility of the National Government, through the Chief Executive, to dispel any such forcible resistance to Federal law." 41 Opinions of the Attorney General 313, 324 (1957).

4. The States have called out the National Guard in many instances in the past to maintain the peace. However, in certain instances the States have refused to call out the Guard, and as a result the U. S. Government federalized the Guard and called it to duty.

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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB D

National Security Act of 1947 and CIA Act of 1949

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to point up the necessity of clarifying the presumed authority of the DCI and the Agency to issue to CIA Staff Employees firearms, explosives, and gas deterrents for their official use in physically protecting anywhere in the United States, CIA personnel and CIA facilities in which classified material is stored.

1. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 102(d)(3) as amended states:

a. "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities... it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the NSC (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the National Security... provided that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions... and provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

b. The CIA Act of 1949, Section 5 states:

"In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to... '(d) Authorize couriers and guards designated by the Director to carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and material affecting the National Defense Security'."

Comment:

a. In the past the portion of the National Security Act of 1947, as stated above has been interpreted as giving the DCI authority to issue to CIA Staff Employees firearms, explosives, gas deterrents, etc. for their official use in physically protecting, anywhere in the U. S., Agency personnel, and CIA facilities in which classified material is stored. At one time all Security Patrol members were

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issued pistols. The use of guns under this authority should be clarified by the General Counsel because such authority is not specifically stated nor implied. It is noted GSA guards, as Special Police, are officially authorized to use firearms in carrying out their official duties. If it is determined that CIA employees (the Security Patrol) are authorized to carry firearms, the guidelines for shooting another person in defending personnel and protecting CIA property should be determined. In this connection, the laws of the District and the several States come into play and must be recognized.

b. Also the CIA Act of 1949 has been interpreted as proper authorization to issue firearms to CIA employees for their use in protecting CIA personnel, and protecting CIA facilities in which classified material is stored. This also should be clarified because it clearly states "Authorized couriers and guards designated by the Director to carry firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and material affecting the National Defense and Security." This refers specifically to those engaged in transportation of confidential documents and material and not static guarding.

c. A point for consideration in 1 b above is guidelines for actual use (firing) of guns by couriers and guards in their official duty. At what point will they shoot another person in their effort to protect their classified material?

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TAB E

Office of Security

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to point up the functions of the Office of Security as related to physical security protection of CIA personnel and facilities and the rate of the Security Patrol as currently constituted. Also to suggest that the firearm authority be clarified.

1. HR [REDACTED] - This gives the Office of Security Mission and Functions which includes:

(1) "Recommend the establishment of Agency policies relating to Security and establish procedures for their implementation." (Par. g(2)(a))

(2) "Establish safeguards necessary to prevent physical penetration of the Agency's establishments by unauthorized individuals..." (Par. g(2)(e))

(3) Plan, develop, and conduct an Agency Safety and fire prevention program for domestic installations and furnish staff guidance and assistance for the development of similar overseas programs. (Par. g(2)(r))

2. CIA Emergency Security Patrol:

a. HR [REDACTED] - CIA Emergency Security Patrol:

This regulation established the CIA Security Patrol "to protect classified material, installations, property, and personnel of the agency in the United States in the event of an emergency, including riot, fire, National Disaster, enemy attack, or other circumstances." Paragraph b(2), "Authorities and Responsibilities" states "The Director of Security, as Commanding Officer of the Security Patrol, is responsible for: (b) Ensuring that Security Patrol members are qualified and authorized to carry firearms in the performance of their duties as

authorized under the provisions of Section 6(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 208). "

b. Security Patrol Manual:

The Security Patrol Manual, dated April 1965, paragraph 5 "Equipment," states "Firearms will be drawn only as authorized by the Director of Security. "

Comment:

a. The above indicated that the Director of Security has authority to equip the Patrol with firearms and that Patrol members are officially authorized to use such firearms (shoot another person, if deemed necessary) in carrying out Patrol missions. It is noted that this authority is not related nor referred in any way to couriers and guards who are authorized to carry guns under the 1949 CIA Act.

b. This presumed official authority of the Director of Security to issue firearms to CIA employees for their use (shooting another person, if deemed necessary) throughout the United States, in the protection of CIA personnel and buildings which house classified material should very definitely be clarified. In the past, this authority has been interpreted as stemming from the National Security Act of 1947, Section 102, and the CIA Act of 1949, Section 5, as related to "Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods, and Executive Order 10501. " However, it is believed that this authority is not clear and should be clarified before firearms are issued to CIA employees.

c. In studying and arriving at solutions for handling riots, as they might affect CIA, a realistic view must be taken regarding the Patrol's capability beyond that of observers, assisting GSA guards at Key places, directing traffic, liaison with the regular enforcement officers, etc. The actual place of the Patrol in a riot situation such as Los Angeles should be studied.

d. As concerns comments a and b above, special reference is made to Tab G, paragraph 3b which outlines the "Use of Firearms" by GSA Special Police.

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TAB F

CIA Emergency Planning Officer

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to give the broad responsibilities of the CIA/EPO and to point up certain conflicts of Security interest in the Regulation.

HR [REDACTED] Building, Emergency Plans and HR [REDACTED]
Emergency Plans

1. HR [REDACTED] makes the CIA Emergency Planning Officer responsible for "The development and preparation of overall Agency emergency plans." HR [REDACTED] Building Emergency Plans, supplements HR [REDACTED] and prescribes the Agency's policy regarding the development and publication of plans of action to be taken in the event of any type of emergency situation which might affect the normal operation of the Agency. This responsibility includes civil disturbances, riots, etc., however, excluded from this responsibility is that for the Agency's program for fire and safety which comes under the Director of Security. The geographic coverage of this responsibility is not clear. HR [REDACTED] Headquarters Emergency Plans gives Headquarters relocation responsibility to the CIA/EPO.

Comment:

a. There is a conflict of responsibility between the Director of Security and the CIA/EPO. That is, the Director of Security (HR [REDACTED]) is charged with the preparation and execution of the Agency's Security program, while the CIA/EPO, in HR [REDACTED] HR [REDACTED] and HR [REDACTED] is given responsibility for the development and preparation of plans for riot, natural disaster, and enemy attack. HR [REDACTED] and HR [REDACTED] and HR [REDACTED] are in the process of being revised. According to the Regulations Control Staff comments received in Agency coordination were sent to the CIA/EPO in February 1965 for resolution. It is interesting to note, however, that the CIA/EPO retains planning responsibility for riots, natural disaster, etc., in the proposed revision.

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b. It should be pointed out that we are not aware of any actions by the CIA/EPO in respect to the protection of CIA personnel and facilities during riots.

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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB G

General Services Administration

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to bring into focus the role and responsibility of the GSA in planning for and protecting federal property during riot situations.

1. Establishment:

The General Services Administration was established by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 377 as amended; 5 USC, 630) effective 1 July 1949.

2. Responsibility:

a. GSA Basic Responsibility:

(1) GSA Headquarters at Washington, D. C. is responsible for the protection of the property under its control and for the safety of persons occupying such property. This responsibility is a function of the Building Division of the Public Buildings Service of GSA. It includes management, maintenance, operation, repairs and protection of buildings, both Federally owned and leased, in which are provided housing accommodations for Government activities. (Page 434, U. S. Government Organization Manual, Public Buildings Service and chapters 1 and 10, PBS P 5930.2, GSA Handbook on Physical Protection)

(2) The policies and established procedures for carrying out this responsibility is contained in GSA Handbook PBS P 5930.2 dated 20 May 1960.

(3) GSA Order 3 ADM 5930.3 dated 12 February 1965 establishes protective procedures to be instituted in the event riots or demonstrations occur on or in the vicinity of property controlled by GSA. The Washington, D. C. area is in GSA Region 3.

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b. Office of Building Management, GSA Washington, D. C.:

The Protection Division of the Office of Buildings Management, GSA Washington, D. C., is charged with the planning and developing of policies, procedures, standards, and guides for the protection of Federal property. The actual protection of such property is a function of the Area and Building Managers. The DDS/PTOS maintains liaison with the Chief, Office of Public Building Service on day-to-day physical security matters.

c. Protective Branch, GSA:

The Chief, Protective Branch of the Protection Division, is responsible for developing regional guidelines and procedures for safeguarding GSA property in the event riots or demonstrations occur. (The Building Security Branch of OS has liaison with the Chief, Protective Branch)

d. GSA Regional Offices:

Regional Offices are established in 10 cities throughout the United States. Within its area of jurisdiction, each Regional Office is responsible for executing the General Services Administration programs which parallel the pattern established for the Central Office at Washington, D. C.

Location of Regional Offices:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
No. 1. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont.	Boston
No. 2. Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands.	New York, N. Y.
No. 3. District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia.	Washington, D. C.
No. 4. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee.	Atlanta
No. 5. Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin.	Chicago
No. 6. Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota.	Kansas City

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<u>Region</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
No. 7. Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas.	Dallas
No. 8. Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming.	Denver
No. 9. California, Hawaii, Nevada.	San Francisco
No. 10. Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington	Auburn, Washington

e. Chief, Central Protective Force, GSA:

The Chief, Central Protective Force, is responsible for the preparation and implementation, in the event of riot or demonstration, of an overall plan and establishing procedures for safeguarding GSA controlled property in the Metropolitan Washington area.

f. GSA Area and Building Managers:

Area and Building Managers are responsible for the protection of property under their control, and for the safety of personnel occupying such property. Accordingly, they prepare a separate plan for each of their buildings for implementation when a riot or demonstration is indicated.

g. Mutual Assistance Agreement:

The Area Manager establishes and maintains liaison with the District United States Commissioner, Attorney, and Marshal; the FBI; and local county, and state officials in his area of responsibility. He confers with them and draws up an agreement for mutual assistance which shall provide for:

(1) Plans for temporarily deputizing guards who have not been appointed as U. S. Special Police, or warden personnel, by the U. S. Marshal or other authority.

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(2) Provides for the establishment during emergency periods of a common command post in coordination with local law enforcement agencies, and for the receipt of information concerning:

- (a) Time and place of demonstration
- (b) Number of persons involved and their activities
- (c) Composition of organizations involved
- (d) Plans of participants, if known
- (e) Arms of participants, if any
- (f) Methods of Communications
- (g) Leaders - Known subversives
- (h) Assembly areas

h. U. S. Marshals:

Department of Justice Memorandum No. 8, dated 7 April 1953 directs U. S. Marshals to assist GSA in coping with disturbances in Federal Buildings upon request of the building superintendent. (See Tab L)

3. GSA Physical Protection Policy:

a. General Policy:

"The laws establishing the responsibility of GSA for protection of facilities under its control do not specify the amount of Physical Security protection to be provided. The policy of GSA is to provide reasonable protection for facilities, material, employees, and others using the facilities. Reasonable protection is defined as that degree of personal and/or mechanical protection required in normal day-to-day operations to prevent serious damage, loss or interference from the hazards of fire, storm, or negligence, or from acts contrary to law or regulations. If, despite the protection provided, any of the above described conditions occur, the protection force shall be prepared to take the emergency measures necessary to minimize resulting hardships, injury, or interference."

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b. Use of Firearms:

"There are very few instances where firearms are used by a guard. However, this is not indicative of its value and effectiveness as a part of the official uniform and equipment. As in the case of the uniform and badge, the value is psychological as a crime deterrent. The badge is a public and official notice of the authority of the wearer, and the sidearm is evidence of such additional power as may be necessary to enforce and effectively maintain an arrest. The firearm should not be used except in extreme emergencies and then only in actual defense of the guard's or another person's life. The guard must be certain that the situation is so serious, life is so greatly endangered, and the crime or attempted crime is of such magnitude, that he is confident a jury would find him justified in its use." (Chapter 3, par. 4b, PBS P 5930.2, 19 July 1963)

4. Standing Operating Procedures:

a. Demonstrations:

(1) General Policy:

(a) It is policy of GSA to allow public access to the grounds, buildings, etc., except for restricted areas.

(b) The Area Manager establishes and maintains liaison with the District United States Commissioner, Attorney, and Marshal; the FBI; and local, county, and state police officials in his area of responsibility.

(c) Guards not appointed as special policemen should be so appointed as needed.

(d) As soon as the building manager becomes aware that there is an intention to commit unlawful acts against Federal property he notifies higher authority as appropriate.

(e) When there is prior notice that a demonstration will take place on GSA controlled property, the guards will be given regular instructions on entrance, conduct, etc.

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(f) If persons should gain entrance and then begin to demonstrate, either individually or as a group, they are asked to leave. If they refuse, become disorderly or offer possitive resistance they are arrested.

(2) (a) Tab M contains a sample of a mutual assistance agreement for handling demonstrations in the Baltimore Area.

(b) Riots:

(1) General: GSA Order 3 ADM 5930.3, 12 February 1965, Subject: Riots and Demonstrations, issued by GSA Regional Administration, Region 3, implements GSA, physical protection 10-3 (PBS P 5930.2), and the Handbook for guards (PBS P 5930.2A) and establishes protective policies, procedures and a format for planning coping with riots. (See Tab N)

(2) Content of GSA Riot Plans: "Protection plans for riots should include the protective measures to be applied at each installation, taking into consideration guard force units, warden personnel, lighting, protective fencing, etc. Appendix B is a sample of a coordinating plan for area protection against riots and demonstrations. Plans should cover and include in detail the following:

(a) Purpose.

(b) Implementing instructions.

(c) Boundaries of critical city area, or areas. Specific instructions relative to protective measures for the most critical or vital building areas should be included. Vital areas should be listed and restrictive measures indicated.

(d) Instructions to all employees on physical security measures to safeguard property and for securing classified information.

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(e) Identification and control system to be instituted in each building during emergency conditions. Procedures for visitors, employees, contractors, vendors, packages and vehicular controls will be included.

(f) Emergency actions to be taken by the guard force or warden personnel under emergency conditions for the protection of installations, property and personnel. In the Metropolitan Washington area, building plans will be compatible with the overall plan prepared by the Chief, Central Protection Force. Plans will include but not be limited to:

(1) Estimate of guards or warden personnel needed to meet a situation, additional posts contemplated and arrangements for providing support personnel.

(2) Weapons and use.

(3) Apprehension and restraint. (See the HN, [REDACTED])

25X1A

(4) Procedures for notification and assembly of support personnel.

(5) Communications instructions:

(a) Command Post.

(b) Communication Center.

(c) Observation Posts. Walkie-Talkies should be located at points of vantage such as upper stories of buildings.

(d) Liaison communication with local law enforcement agencies and between guard units and warden personnel.

(e) Authorized communications channels.

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(f) Uniform of the day.

(g) Instructions for terminating emergency plans.

(h) Reporting of incidents internally and to PBS and BMD personnel (see 3 PBS 5900.2, Action Required in Promptly Reporting Unusual Incidents or Emergencies.)

(3) Tab O contains a GSA plan for the Washington, D. C. area for coping with possible demonstrations or riots during Labor Day weekend of 1964.

Comment:

a. As previously stated the DDS/PTOS has liaison with the Public Buildings Service of GSA on day-to-day regular protection matters, and the Building Security Branch has liaison with the Protective Branch of the Public Buildings Service, GSA on similar matters. However, it is understood that liaison has not extended fully to include plans, etc. in the event of a Los Angeles type riot in the Washington area, nor are we knowledgeable of GSA plans in this respect. It is believed that OS should be informed on this matter.

b. It should also be pointed out that OS is not knowledgeable of GSA Regional plans in which CIA facilities are located. It is believed that we should be knowledgeable so as to permit further planning and coordination, if necessary to protect CIA facilities.

c. Further, we are not knowledgeable as to whether or not the several States and local police forces have adequate plans and capability to protect CIA private contractors who are doing classified work. It is believed that OS should be knowledgeable of the situation so as to permit further planning, as necessary.

d. In connection with a, b, and c above, we are not knowledgeable, of course, of the coordination and mutual assistance developed by GSA with other protective forces (State, local police, FBI, Park Police, etc.). It is believed that OS should be informed.

TAB

ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB H

The District of Columbia Police

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to explore the responsibilities, authority and plans of the District of Columbia Police Force in planning for and action during riots and to determine their relationship with other protective Agencies, i. e., GSA, Park Police, FBI, etc.

1. Establishment:

"Reorganization Order No. 46 of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia dated 26 June 1953 established, under the direction and control of the President of the Board of Commissioners, a Metropolitan Police Department headed by a Chief of Police where authority is to be exercised in accordance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations." (Par. 4-101, page 266, Title 4)

2. Area Responsibility:

"The Metropolitan Police District of the District of Columbia shall be co-extensive with the District of Columbia, and shall be subdivided into such police districts and precincts as the Commissioner shall determine." (Par. 4-102, page 266, Title 4)

3. Police to Have Powers of Constables:

The members of the Board of Commissioners, and of the police force, shall possess in every part of the District all the common-law powers of constables, except for the service of civil process and for the collection of strictly private debts, in which designation fines imposed for the breach of the ordinances in force in the District, shall not be included. (Par. 4-136, page 275, Title 4)

Specific Duties of the Metropolitan Police Department:

To preserve the public peace;

To prevent crime and arrest offenders;

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To protect the rights of persons and of property;

To guard the public health;

To preserve order at every public election;

To remove nuisances existing in the public streets, roads, alleys, highways, and other places;

To provide a proper police force at every fire, in order that thereby the firemen and property may be protected;

To protect strangers and travelers at steamboat and ship landings and railway-stations;

To see that all laws relating to the observance of Sunday, and regarding pawnbrokers, mock auctions, elections, gambling, intemperance, lottery dealers, vagrants, disorderly persons, and the public health, are promptly enforced; and

To enforce and obey all laws and ordinances in force in the District, or any part thereof, which are properly applicable to police or health, and not inconsistent with the provisions of this title. (Par. 4-119, page 269, Title 4)

4. Arrest Without Warrant:

The several members of the police force shall have power and authority to immediately arrest, without warrant, and to take into custody any person who shall commit, or threaten or attempt to commit, in the presence of such member, or within his view, any breach of the peace or offense directly prohibited by Act of Congress, or by any law or ordinance in force in the District, but such member of the police force shall immediately, and without delay, upon such arrest, convey in person such offender before the proper court, that he may be dealt with according to law. (Par. 4-140, page 276, Title 4)

5. Comment:

a. According to the above, it would appear that the Metropolitan Police has full Top Police jurisdiction and authority within

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the District, but apparently this is not exactly the case. There are other police authorities which have intra-District police jurisdiction and often such jurisdictions are in themselves not entirely clear. (Park Police, Capital Police, GSA-Special Police, White House Police, etc.)

b. As pointed out elsewhere in this report, what authority within the District would have overall command in the event of a District general riot - upheaval is not clear.

c. Metropolitan Police plans for coping with riots, etc., are not known, however, it is believed that CIA should have this information.

d. The Office of Security has liaison with the Metropolitan Police only at the precinct level. It is believed that liaison would be more effective if it were extended to the Office of the Chief of Police, particularly in respect to plans and action related to riots.

e. It is also believed that District Police plans, including coordination with others, would be valuable in determining CIA planning and action during a riot.

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TAB

ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB I

United States Park Police

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to point up U. S. Park Police plans for riots and their relationships with other such forces, including relationship with CIA.

1. Establishment:

The U. S. Park Police was established 5 August 1882, under the exclusive charge and control of the Director of the National Park Service. They have and perform the same powers and duties as the Metropolitan Police of the District within their area of responsibility.

2. Geographic Area of Responsibility:

Basically the geographic area of responsibility includes the lands, buildings, and roads under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service.

3. Basic Responsibilities:

This includes policing of the public parks and other reservations under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service. Park Police may make arrests outside of their jurisdiction if the incident occurred within National Park jurisdiction. Certain CIA facilities and routes of travel are adjacent to or through Park Police jurisdiction.

4. Emergency Plan of Action:

Park Police plans for coping with large scale emergencies in the area of CIA facilities have not been found. It would appear that this information would be valuable to CIA in its planning.

5. Comment:

a. The relationship and area of jurisdiction between the U. S. Park Police and the District of Columbia Police and GSA are not

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clearly stated. The same exists between the U. S. Park Police, the State of Virginia, nearby Virginia Counties and GSA. There are grey areas of authority where CIA facilities are located. During a large scale rioting situation, short of intervention by the National Guard under State authority or by Federal Troops, it would be advantageous to CIA to know the expected Command Channels.

b. The Office of Security (DDS/PTOS) has liaison with the U. S. Park Police at the Chief level on day-to-day support matters, however, we are not aware of the Park Police over-all plans for coping with riots, etc., nor are we knowledgeable as to their relationship with GSA, Metropolitan Police and others in planning for and action during a rioting situation. This information would be valuable to OS particularly for the Washington area.

TAB

ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB J

U. S. Capitol Police

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to explore the responsibilities of the U. S. Capitol Police during riots.

1. Establishment:

The U. S. Capitol Police was established by Public Law 570-70th Congress under the direction of the Capitol Police Board.

2. Geographic Area of Jurisdiction:

The area of jurisdiction for the U. S. Capitol Police includes that portion of the District of Columbia designated as the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds. It is generally in the area of the U. S. Capitol.

3. Basic Responsibilities:

The U. S. Capitol Police polices the U. S. Capitol Buildings and Grounds... and has the power to enforce the provisions of law and regulations and makes arrests within the U. S. Capitol Buildings and Grounds for any violations of any laws of the United States or of any State, or any regulation promulgated pursuant thereto. However, the Metropolitan Police Force of the District of Columbia are authorized to make arrests within the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds for any violations of any such laws or regulations, but must have consent of the Capitol Police Board to enter buildings to make arrests or to serve warrants. The Capitol Police Board has exclusive charge and control of all vehicular and other traffic, including parking, etc., except certain designated streets which are under the control of the District Police.

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The U. S. Capitol Police obtains assistance from the Metropolitan Police as needed. There are grey areas in terms of jurisdiction between the U. S. Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police, however, for the most part the U. S. Capitol Police governs insofar as day-to-day work is concerned.

4. Comment:

a. The Command relationship and coordination that would exist among the U. S. Capitol Police, the Metropolitan District Police, the U. S. Park Police and others, in the event of a large scale riot within the District, is not known. It is believed that such would be valuable information for over-all planning purposes and at the time of an emergency.

b. The Office of Security does not have liaison with the U. S. Capitol Police. It is believed that liaison should be established and maintained.

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TAB

ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB K

Protection of CIA Contractor Facilities Which House Classified Material

Note: The purpose of this Tab is to point up the current status, based on available information, of plans (Federal, State and local) for protecting, during riot situations, CIA private contractors which perform classified work.

1. Responsibility:

The protection of private contractor facilities is the responsibility of the firm itself, local police and the state in which such facilities are located. For Federal protection see Tab B.

2. Situation:

a. CIA has contracts (often very highly classified) with private firms throughout the United States. Their protection rests with the contractor protective procedures and capability, the local police force, and the state in which the facility is located. The Los Angeles riots pointed up the vulnerability of these contractor facilities located in that area.

b. According to a Memorandum For Chief, Procurement Division/OL, from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some of CIA sensitive contractor facilities were not properly guarded, and presumably had the riot hit such facilities CIA classified material would have been compromised. It is reasonable to assume that similar conditions exist throughout the U. S. insofar as plans for protecting such facilities during riots.

c. It should be noted that most or many of these contracts are classified which means that the local police and the state authorities presumably would not be aware of the need for extra protection.

Further the local authorities under a rioting situation of some size simply would not have the protective power required.

3. Comment:

a. As a result of the Los Angeles riot, and as pointed up by the Logistic Memorandum, cited above, it must be assumed that at many places CIA private contractors would not be provided proper protection during a riot of the Los Angeles magnitude. In any event, plans for such protection have not been found, and it is believed that for the most part they are non-existent.

b. It is believed that the existing in-being plans for protecting CIA contractor facilities against riots should be explored, and that appropriate action be taken to ensure that adequate support is planned for those that house classified matter. Also it is believed that the situation should be explored with the appropriate U. S. Army Area Headquarters.

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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB L

**Department of Justice
Washington**

**April 7, 1953
MEMO. NO. 8**

MEMORANDUM TO ALL UNITED STATES MARSHALS

From time to time there have been threats of disturbances in Federal Buildings by unruly persons which have given General Services Administration some concern. To be prepared for any future contingencies United States Marshals and their deputies are hereby instructed to lend any assistance in coping with disturbances in Federal Buildings upon request of the building superintendent. Marshals are authorized to take such steps, including special deputization of persons or guards, as the situation may require. Full report in writing should be submitted to the Department in such an event.

**S. A. ANDRETTA
Administrative
Assistant Attorney General**

Figure 10-3. Department of Justice Memorandum No. 8

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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB M

3ADM 5930.3

February 12, 1965

AGREEMENT

Between

Baltimore Law Enforcement Agencies and General Services

Administration for the Handling of Riots & Demonstrations

September 2, 1964

1. By agreement the Police Departments, Baltimore City and Baltimore County; the Baltimore City Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U. S. Marshal and General Services Administration accept the responsibilities indicated in paragraph 3 below for the handling of riots and demonstrations that may occur in the Metropolitan Baltimore, Maryland area.

2. Background. A meeting was held on September 2, 1964, in the Office of the Manager, Baltimore Area, Region 3, General Services Administration for the purpose of coordinating GSA activities with those of the agencies listed in paragraph 1, supra, in an effort to establish a planned method of handling possible riots or demonstrations in the Metropolitan Baltimore, Maryland area. The following were in attendance:

F. T. Martin, Acting Manager, Baltimore Area	GSA
Ellis Bubb, Captain Guard Force, West Md. Group	GSA
C. P. Bichell, Buildings Manager, West Md. Group	GSA
John W. Ray, Buildings Manager, Chesapeake Group	GSA
Jack S. Booz, Captain, Guard Force, Chesapeake Group	GSA
George Zegolis, Protection Branch, Washington, D. C.	GSA
Millard B. Horton, Inspector, Baltimore City Police Department	
Lt. W. J. Gibson, Northwestern District, Baltimore County Police Department	
Thomas J. Kenney, U. S. Attorney, Post Office Building, Baltimore, Maryland	
Fred S. Bauknight, FBI, Baltimore, Maryland	
Paul M. Griber, FBI, Baltimore, Maryland	
Frank Udoff, U. S. Marshal, Baltimore, Maryland	

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3. Agreements:

a. The Baltimore City Police Department will be responsible for controlling activities on sidewalks adjoining Government property and for assisting the GSA Guard Force on any Federal Property that may be trespassed in the city of Baltimore, Maryland.

b. The Baltimore County Police Department will be responsible for controlling activities on sidewalks and grounds adjoining Government property and for assisting the GSA Guard Force on any Federal Property that may be trespassed in their jurisdiction (Baltimore County).

c. Upon request of the Buildings Managers the U. S. Marshal, Baltimore, Maryland, will lend assistance in coping with disturbances in Federal Buildings and will take such steps, including special deputization of guards or Building Organization for Self-Protection personnel, as the situation may require.

d. The GSA Control Center in the Chesapeake Group will serve as the emergency control point for emergency operations. Commanding Officer, Guard Force, Chesapeake Group is designated as coordinator between the Baltimore Law Enforcement Agencies and the GSA Guard Force.

e. The Baltimore City Field Office, FBI, the Baltimore City Police Department and the Baltimore County Police Department will furnish the GSA Control Center, Chesapeake Group pertinent intelligence concerning riots or demonstration as it develops.

f. The following law enforcement telephone numbers will be used for assistance, etc.:

- | | |
|--|-------------------|
| (1) GSA Control Center, Chesapeake Group | PLaza 8460, 2773, |
| (2) Baltimore City Police Radio | SAratoga 7-1200 |
| (3) Baltimore County Police Radio | VALley 3-4040 |
| (4) Federal Bureau of Investigation | LEXington 9-6700 |
| (5) U. S. Marshal | MULberry 5-8320 |
| | X-3374 |
| (6) Area Manager, Baltimore Area (GSA) | MULberry 5-8320 |

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February 12, 1965

For U. S. Marshal

Frank Udoff

U. S. Marshal

For General Services Administration

F. T. Martin

Acting Manager, Baltimore Area

For Federal Bureau of Investigation

Fred S. Bauknight

Agent, FBI

For Baltimore City Police Department

Millard B. Horton

Inspector, Baltimore City Police Department

For Northwestern District, Baltimore City Police Department

W. J. Gibson

Lt. Baltimore County Police

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ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

TAB N

3ADM 5930.3

February 12, 1965

GSA ORDER

SUBJECT : Riots and Demonstrations

1. PURPOSE. This order implements the HE, Physical Protection 10-3 (PBS P 5930.2) and the Handbook for Guards (PBS P 5930.1A), and establishes protective procedures to be instituted in the event riots or demonstrations occur on or in the vicinity of property controlled by General Services Administration, Region 3.

2. GENERAL.

a. Improper methods of controlling peaceful demonstrations at Region 3 GSA-controlled facilities could result in substantial criticism. Therefore, every effort should be made in advance to establish clear, workable plans to make certain that persons engaged in demonstrations are controlled with due regard to their legal and constitutional rights.

b. Riots on the other hand, can be vicious and dangerous. They can flare from violent, uncontrolled emotions in a matter of minutes. The measures taken should be in proportion to the violence of the resistance encountered and the dangers anticipated. Obviously it is most important that workable plans also be developed in anticipation of riots.

3. RESPONSIBILITY.

a. The Chief, Protection Branch, is responsible for developing regional guidelines and procedures for safeguarding GSA property in the event riots or demonstrations occur.

b. Area and Buildings Managers are responsible for the protection of property under their control, and for the safety of personnel occupying such property. Accordingly they will prepare a separate building plan for each of their buildings for implementation when a riot or demonstration is indicated. Building plans will be prepared in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4c below.

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3ADM 5930.3
February 12, 1965

c. The Chief, Central Protection Force, is responsible for the preparation and implementation, in the event of riots or demonstration, of an overall plan establishing procedure for safeguarding GSA-controlled property in the Metropolitan Washington area.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES.

a. Area or Buildings Managers in areas outside Metropolitan Washington area and the Chief, Central Protection Force, shall establish and maintain liaison with the District United States Commissioner, the appropriate United States Attorneys, the United States Marshals, the FBI, local, county, and state police officials in their areas of responsibility. They shall confer with them and draw up mutual assistance agreements for handling riots and demonstrations. Appendix A is a sample of a mutual assistance agreement.

b. Agreements should provide for temporarily deputizing the guards who have not been appointed as U. S. Special Police, or warden personnel, by the U. S. Marshal or other authority. Agreements should also provide for the establishment, during emergency periods, of a common command post/control center in coordination with local law enforcement agencies, and for the receipt of information concerning:

- (1) Time and place of demonstration.
- (2) Number of persons involved and their activities.
- (3) Compositions of organizations involved.
- (4) Plans of participants, if known.
- (5) Arms of participants, if any.
- (6) Methods of communication.
- (7) Leaders - known subversives.
- (8) Assembly areas.

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TAB

ANALYSIS OF RIOT PLANNING

3ADM 5930.3
February 12, 1965

TAB O

GSA Emergency Preparedness Plan for Possible Demonstrations
during Labor Day Weekend, 1964

September 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO: All Battalion and Company Commanders
Control Center Operators

FROM : Chief, Central Protection Force -3PBG

1. General. There exists the possibility that demonstrations may be staged in Washington, D. C. over Labor Day weekend.
2. Purpose. The purpose of this publication is to outline plans for the protection of Government-owned buildings primarily and Government-leased buildings insofar as practicable.
3. Implementation. This plan will be implemented upon receipt of authentic information that demonstrations will be or are planned to be staged in the Metropolitan Washington area.
4. Anticipated Critical Areas. On 14th Street, N. W., from Rhode Island Avenue to Florida Avenue. On H Street, N. E., from 8th Street to 15th Street.
 - a. There are no Government-owned buildings in this area.
 - b. There is one Government-leased building in this area, a warehouse at 1331 U Street, N. W.
5. Notification. The Control Center will initiate notification. (See Annex A). Each Company will arrange its own system for notification of key and other personnel.

Appendix B. Sample Copy of a Guard Force Coordinating Plan.

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CONFIDENTIAL

3ADM 5930.3
February 12, 1965

Assignments

- a. N. R. Karicher - Chief, Task Force.
- b. Mr. C. E. Jennings - Deputy Chief for Operations.
- c. Mr. A. I. O'Brien - Deputy Chief for Communications.
- d. Chief Inspector Lawton - Field Commander.
- e. Captain Bell - Assistant Field Commander.

6. Communications.

- a. Control Center, ROB - Communications Center.
- b. Observation Points, walkie-talkie at each location:
 - (1) 1331 U Street, N. W. - to be manned by Company I.
 - (2) GAO Building - to be manned by Company L.
 - (3) Veterans Building - to be manned by Company I.
 - (4) State Department Building - to be manned by Company D.
 - (5) Justice Building - to be manned by Company K.
- c. Observation points are authorized direct communication between points and are to keep Control Center advised of all information pertinent to demonstrations.
- d. The Field Commander will keep in radio contact with the Deputy Chief for Communications.
- e. The Deputy for Communications will maintain liaison with the Baltimore City Police Department.

7. Special Details. Companies of primary concern are Company I and Company L. Company I field headquarters will be located in Veterans Administration Building, and Company L field headquarters will be located in GAO Building.

- a. Company D will be prepared to assist and augment forces in Company I.
- b. Company K will be prepared to assist and augment forces in Company L.

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c. Additional minimum support will be furnished as follows:

- (1) Company A, 3 men to Company I
- (2) Company B, 2 men to Company I
- (3) Company E, 4 men to Company I
- (4) Company F, 4 men to Company L
- (5) Company H, 12 men to Company L

d. All Companies except Companies C and G will be prepared to change to 12 hour shifts. This will be effected upon direction from the Chief, Central Protection Force.

e. All Companies will be prepared to call in personnel on leave and days off.

f. Should manpower needs dictate, some OE guard posts will be suspended. Each company will have plans for this possibility but will not suspend any posts without coordination with Deputy for Operations.

8. Employment of Forces. The Field Commander will employ forces as dictated by the situation to accomplish the purpose outlined in paragraph 2, above.

a. He will keep the Deputy Chief for Communications informed of all developments and changes in plan necessitated by the situation.

b. Should demonstrators proceed in a direction which leads to Government-owned or Government-leased buildings, forces will be located and/or relocated in those buildings which may be threatened.

9. Use of Firearms. To be employed only when all other means have failed and then for the protection of life only.

10. Termination of Emergency. The Central Protection Force will resume normal operations upon declaration by the Chief, Central Protection Force of termination of the emergency.

N. Robert Karicher

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